Apriority, Super-Rigidity, and Fregean Content by Smithson, Robert
 Apriority, Super-Rigidity, and Fregean Content 
 
Robert Smithson 
 
A thesis submitted to the faculty of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in the 
Department of Philosophy. 
 
Chapel Hill 
2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Approved by: 
           
       William Lycan 
 
       Keith Simmons 
 
       John Roberts 
  
 ii
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
ROBERT SMITHSON: Apriority, Super-Rigidity, and Fregean Content 
(Under the direction of William Lycan) 
 
 What is the difference between an utterance of the sentence ‘Hesperus is 
Hesperus’ and an utterance of the sentence ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’? David 
Chalmers claims that these sentences are psychologically and epistemologically 
distinct because they are associated with distinct fine-grained Fregean 
propositions. In “The Nature of Epistemic Space” (2011a), Chalmers offers a 
rigorous analysis of epistemic possibility that he claims can be used to ground an 
account of Fregean content that is available to a wide variety of theorists. In this 
thesis, I will identify the assumptions required by Chalmers’ construction of 
epistemic space in order to evaluate whether it is indeed capable of grounding a 
widely acceptable account of Fregean content. I conclude the thesis by 
comparing Chalmers’ Fregean content to alternative Russellian accounts of 
cognitive significance. 
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 1   Overview: Epistemic possibility and Fregean content 
 
 There is a vast literature on metaphysical possibility. The dominant 
contemporary approach to understanding metaphysical possibility is to think of 
possibility and necessity in terms of possible worlds. There are certainly 
disagreements about the nature of possible worlds (are they concrete 
spatiotemporally isolated universes? are they ersatz representations? etc.), but 
the different competing accounts of possible worlds are at least relatively well-
understood. 
 But there is a second type of possibility that is not nearly as well-
understood. Let’s say that it is epistemically possible for a subject that p when it 
might be that p for all a subject knows. Here are some examples. For all I know, 
it might be that the stock market goes up tomorrow, and it might be that it goes 
down. It might be that the woman sitting at the bus stop is a skilled musician, or it 
might be that she is not. There are even more ways the world might be, for all I 
know with certainty. It might be that I am a brain in a vat, and it might be that I am 
not. It might be that water is H2O, and it might be that water is XYZ. It might be 
that Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus, or it might be that Hesperus is not 
identical to Phosphorus. 
 From the last two examples in particular, it should be clear that epistemic 
possibility cannot be analyzed using the traditional framework of metaphysically 
possible worlds. After all, there are no possible worlds where water is XYZ, yet in 
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at least one sense ‘water is XYZ’ is epistemically possible. As an alternative, 
Chalmers introduces the notion of a scenario, which is a kind of epistemic 
analogue to a metaphysically possible world. Intuitively, a scenario is a maximally 
specific way things might turn out to be. Chalmers’ hope is that, just as we use 
the space of possible worlds to analyze metaphysical possibility, we can use the 
space of scenarios to analyze epistemic possibility. 
 But giving a rigorous account of the space of scenarios is important for a 
second, independent reason: Chalmers hopes to use epistemic space to ground 
an account of Fregean propositions that reflect a sentence/thought’s cognitive 
significance for its speaker/subject. Without discussing the finer details of 
Chalmers’ account of Fregean content (see footnote 1), suffice to say that one of 
the crucial semantic values Chalmers assigns to a sentence/thought is its 
primary (“epistemic”) intension.1 Primary intensions are functions from scenarios 
to extension. So if Chalmers can give a widely acceptable account of epistemic 
space, it seems that he will also be able to give a widely acceptable account of 
Fregean content. The general aim of this paper is to identify exactly what 
assumptions are required by Chalmers’ account. To this end, I will use section 1 
to provide an overview of the essentials of Chalmers’ preferred account of 
                                                 
1
 Chalmers (2011b) defines the primary intension for a linguistic expression as a function from scenarios to 
extension. He defines an enriched intension as the ordered pair of an expression’s primary intension and its 
extension. Chalmers also defines a structured primary intension for a complex logical expression to be a 
structure consisting of the primary intensions of all the simple expressions in a sentence, structured 
according to the sentence’s logical form. He then is able to define the enriched proposition of a sentence to 
be a structure consisting of the enriched intension of the sentence’s logical parts, structured according to the 
sentence’s logical form. Chalmers claims that enriched propositions and enriched intensions behave very 
similarly to Fregean thoughts and Fregean senses, respectively. So strictly speaking, a sentence’s full 
cognitive significance is reflected in its enriched proposition, not its primary intension. But since these 
semantic values are closely related and since the differences between them are not usually relevant to the 
arguments in this thesis, I will use the expression “Fregean content” to refer to each of them 
interchangeably. 
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epistemic space, which he calls the epistemic construction.2 I will conclude 
section 1 with a list of the assumptions that seem to be required by Chalmers’ 
account. 
1.1   Epistemic possibility 
 Chalmers claims that it is epistemically possible (for a subject) that p iff 
there exists a scenario (for that subject) that verifies p (2011a: 64) This definition 
presents at least four immediate questions. What is epistemic possibility? What 
type of object is p? What is a scenario? What is the verification relation? I will 
consider these questions in the next several sections. 
 What exactly is epistemic possibility? Chalmers is a pluralist in his 
understanding of epistemic possibility: he allows that there are many notions of 
epistemic possibility which may be more or less useful for different projects. In 
other words, there isn’t a single “correct” account of what sentences are 
epistemically possible; what counts as epistemically possible depends on one’s 
present philosophical purposes. For example, we might distinguish between 
subject-relative and subject-independent epistemic possibility. We can define 
strict epistemic possibility as ways things might be, for all some particular subject 
knows. We could distinguish this from deep epistemic possibility as ways things 
might be, for all any subject knows (that is: p is deeply epistemically possible 
when there is no subject who knows that ~p). Strict epistemic possibility will be 
more useful if we are interested in modeling the doxastic state of a single 
                                                 
2
 Chalmers also offers an alternative metaphysical construction, according to which scenarios are centered 
possible worlds. Because some of the assumptions required by the metaphysical construction are 
controversial, Chalmers prefers the epistemic construction and thinks that it is available to a wider variety of 
theorists. 
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individual. But deep epistemic possibility is more important if we are interested in 
grounding an account of subject-independent Fregean content. Throughout this 
thesis, I follow Chalmers in focusing on deep epistemic possibility. 
 Even when restricting our attention to deep epistemic possibility, we can 
define a spectrum of standards for what counts as epistemically possible. On the 
maximally liberal end of the spectrum, we might have a standard of epistemic 
possibility according to which even logical contradictions are epistemically 
possible. Perhaps this standard would be useful for making sense of the 
epistemic states of extremely non-ideal thinkers. But it certainly won’t be help to 
ground an account of Fregean content. 
 On the other end of the spectrum, we can try to define a type of idealized 
epistemic possibility. On this idealized account, p is deeply epistemically 
necessary when p is a priori under idealization. The idealization employed in this 
account abstracts away from contingent cognitive limitations: if a hypothesis can 
be excluded only by a great amount of a priori reasoning, it is nonetheless ruled 
out a priori. For example, if Goldbach’s Conjecture is true, then it is a priori; if it is 
false, then its negation is a priori.3 Between these two ends of the spectrum, 
there are a range of standards of epistemic possibility that one might define, 
perhaps in order to model the epistemic states of non-ideal rational subjects. But 
                                                 
3
 Chalmers (forthcoming) offers many details on what is required by the idealization employed in his 
account. The idealization allows subjects to possess any concept that it is possible to possess, regardless of 
whether they actually possess it. The idealization abstracts away from limitations of complexity, allowing 
subjects to entertain thoughts whose complexity greatly exceeds ordinary human capacity. There is also an 
idealization in calculation: arbitrary numbers of steps of reasoning are allowed, so that (for example) 
enormously complex mathematical theorems come out a priori. The idealization also abstracts away from 
missteps in reasoning. Chalmers (forthcoming) devotes considerable time defending various ways to cash 
out the notion of idealized apriority, but assessing these arguments is outside the scope of this paper. 
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Chalmers is most interested in ideal deep epistemic space, and this is the only 
type of space I will consider in this thesis. 
1.2   The objects of epistemic possibility 
 The objects of epistemic/metaphysical possibility are most commonly 
understood to be propositions, where propositions are some sort of language-
independent entity. But the nature of propositions is contested. What type of 
propositions could serve as the objects of epistemic possibility? On a popular 
Russellian view, the proposition expressed by a sentence is a structure involving 
the objects/properties that are the extensions of the simple logical parts of the 
sentence. But this account of propositions encounters immediate difficulties. For 
example, we want an account of epistemic space on which it is epistemically 
possible that ‘Hesperus ≠ Phosphorus’ even though it is not epistemically 
possible that ‘Hesperus ≠ Hesperus’. But on a Russellian view, ‘H≠P’ and ‘H≠H’ 
express the same proposition. So it is unclear how Russellian propositions could 
serve as the objects of epistemic possibility.4 
 On a Fregean view, the proposition expressed by a sentence is a structure 
of senses expressed by the simple logical parts of the sentence, where senses 
are fine-grained entities reflecting cognitive significance. So Fregean propositions 
seem like better candidates for serving as the objects of epistemic possibility. But 
Chalmers observes that there are two major problems with using Fregean 
                                                 
4
 The same problem arises on a possible-worlds account of propositions, according to which the proposition 
expressed by a sentence is the set of possible worlds where the sentence is true. But for ease of 
presentation, I will frame the issues in this thesis as a dialectic involving the Russellian and the Fregean. 
This is mainly because Russellian theorists have developed a variety of accounts to explain the cognitive 
difference between ‘H=H’ and ‘H=P’, and one of the goals of this thesis is to compare these accounts of 
“propositional guises” to Chalmers’ account of Fregean propositions. 
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propositions in his account of epistemic space. First, the existence of Fregean 
propositions is heavily disputed. It doesn’t seem likely that many theorists will 
accept an account of epistemic space that takes Fregean propositions as 
primitive. But Chalmers wants his account of epistemic space to be available to a 
wide variety of theorists. Second, I’ve mentioned that Chalmers hopes to use 
epistemic space to ground an account of Fregean propositions. So he can’t 
presuppose Fregean propositions without facing a circularity objection. So 
instead, Chalmers considers sentences to be the objects of epistemic possibility.5 
 Recall that p is deeply epistemically necessary when p is a priori under 
idealization. So if sentences are the objects of possibility, the notion of apriority 
must be something that can apply to sentences. But the notions of sentence 
knowledge and sentence apriority are unintuitive and unfamiliar. What does it 
mean to know a sentence a priori, if this doesn’t just mean knowing the 
proposition associated with the sentence a priori? 
 Intuitively, there is a difference between the occurrent mental state of 
someone who sincerely asserts ‘H=H’ and someone who sincerely asserts ‘H=P’. 
Even theorists who assign ‘H=H’ and ‘H=P’ the same proposition usually 
acknowledge some difference between the mental states associated with these 
utterances. For this reason, Chalmers (forthcoming) prefers to cash out the 
                                                 
5
 Both sentence tokens and sentence types can serve as objects of epistemic possibility. A sentence token 
is a specific orthographic item uttered by a subject at a specific place and time. A sentence type is some 
kind of abstract structured entity composed out of simpler expression types, such as words types. Chalmers 
assumes that sentence types belong to their language essentially so that the same expression type cannot 
have tokens in different languages. So the sentence types that Chalmers has in mind are not purely 
orthographic types. 
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notion of sentence apriority directly in terms of mental states.6 Let’s say that 
entertaining is a maximally general propositional attitude (occurrent or non-
occurrent) with a mind-to-world direction of fit. We can then say that a thought is 
a specific state of entertaining. For example, whenever there is a belief or a 
knowing, there is a thought; in these cases, we can say that such a thought 
constitutes the corresponding belief or item of knowledge.7 Chalmers also 
assumes that thoughts are the kind of things that can stand in relations of 
negation, conjunction, and disjunction to each other. We next introduce the idea 
that utterances of truth-apt sentences typically express (occurrent) thoughts. For 
example, sincere utterances express beliefs, and thus express thoughts. In fact, 
even insincere utterances typically express thoughts.8 
 With these materials, Chalmers’ defines a notion of knowing a sentence: S 
knows a sentence token t when S’s utterance of t expresses a thought that 
constitutes an item of knowledge. To introduce apriority to the picture, Chalmers 
begins with an account of apriority for thoughts: a thought T is a priori when T 
constitutes an item of knowledge that is justified independently of experience. We 
                                                 
6
 See Excurses 3 of Constructing the World. Chalmers also mentions that sentence apriority is to be cashed 
out in terms of token mental states in The Nature of Epistemic Space, but the treatment is much more 
detailed in CtW. So my presentation of the notion of sentence knowledge will draw mainly from CtW. 
 
7
 Is the thought state identical to the belief state or the knowledge state? On some views, these states are all 
identical to one another. On other views, these states are distinct, but there is a close relation between 
them. Chalmers wants to remain neutral on this question. 
 
8
 It is important to remember that, on the current usage, expression is a relation between utterances and 
mental states, not a relation between utterances and propositions. But intuitively, says Chalmers, an 
utterance and the thought it expresses share the same propositional content. Chalmers does not build 
sameness of propositional content into the notion of expression, because there may be views where 
thoughts and utterances have different types of content. But at the very least, an utterance should have the 
same truth conditions as the thought it expresses. 
  
 8 
can then say that S knows a sentence token t a priori when S’s utterance of t 
expresses an a priori thought.9 
 One might worry that, in moving to sentences, Chalmers hasn’t escaped 
the original difficulties with propositions. After all, Chalmers cashes out sentence 
knowledge in terms of thoughts with propositional content. But importantly, 
Chalmers’ analysis of a thought is neutral about what type of propositional 
content is associated with thoughts. What’s important for the epistemic 
construction is that it be possible for a subject to know ‘H=H’ but not know ‘H=P’. 
In order to allow for this possibility, the epistemic construction only requires that a 
theorist accept some way or other to distinguish the thoughts associated with 
these utterances. To be sure, since theorists disagree about the nature of 
thoughts, theorists will also disagree about what exactly is required for a subject 
to know ‘H=P’. The Russellian may claim that S knows ‘H=P’ when S’s utterance 
of ‘H=P’ expresses a thought with a certain proposition presented under a certain 
guise. In contrast, Chalmers himself will ultimately cash out sentence knowledge 
in terms of fine-grained Fregean propositions. But either one of these analyses 
will allow a theorist to assign different modal properties to ‘H=H’ and ‘H=P’. Since 
Chalmers doesn’t build Fregean content into the notion of a thought, he can get 
the notion of sentence knowledge off the ground while avoiding a charge of 
circularity. 
 
 
                                                 
9
 What about a notion of sentence knowledge for sentence types? For ease of presentation, I will wait until 
section 2.1 to present the notion of sentence type knowledge. 
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1.3   Scenarios, the verification relation, and plenitude 
 When a sentence t is true at a possible world u, we can say that u satisfies 
t. I’ve already intuitively characterized scenarios as the epistemic analogs of 
possible worlds. Similarly, we can intuitively characterize the verification relation 
as the epistemic analog of the satisfaction relation: a scenario w verifies a 
sentence s when s is true at w. While these characterizations are useful, one 
shouldn’t put too much weight on the analogy between epistemic and 
metaphysical possibility. Scenarios are analogous to possible worlds, but they 
may be very different from possible worlds. Similarly, while we may grant that 
sentences have something analogous to truth conditions across the space of 
scenarios, it would be too quick at this point to speak as if sentences literally 
have a second set of (epistemic) truth conditions. 
 Indeed, it is important to remember that there are many standards of 
epistemic possibility; as a result, we should not expect that there is one single 
“correct” account of scenarios/verification. Instead, our aim is to find some 
account of scenarios/verification that is appropriate for the type of epistemic 
possibility we are modeling. For example, since ‘H≠P’ is not ruled out a priori, it is 
a constraint on the adequacy of any proposed account of ideal epistemic space 
that it include a scenario that verifies ‘H≠P’. More generally, Chalmers offers the 
following principle as a constraint on any adequate theory of epistemic possibility: 
 
    Plenitude: s is epistemically possible iff there is a scenario w such that w 
verifies s 
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 I’ll give an example to make this discussion concrete. Suppose we are 
interested in the maximally liberal account of deep epistemic possibility according 
to which every sentence (including contradictions) is epistemically possible. 
Chalmers suggests that an adequate space of scenarios for this type of 
epistemic possibility might be the power set of the set of sentences, such that 
every set of possible sentences corresponds to a scenario (2011a: 65). He 
doesn’t suggest a corresponding verification relation, but a natural suggestion is 
the set membership relation: a scenario w verifies a sentence s when s is a 
member of w. It seems like this construction will satisfy Plenitude.10 
1.4   Compositionality 
 Obviously, the example construction just given is inadequate for modeling 
ideal epistemic space. This is because it verifies sentences that can be ruled out 
a priori (ie, ‘2+2=0’, ‘John is a bachelor and John is a married’, etc.), thus 
violating Plenitude. A natural suggestion is to restrict the sets of sentences that 
count as scenarios to the sets that only include sentences that cannot be ruled 
out a priori (we can continue to interpret the verification relation as a set 
membership relation). 
 With this adjustment, Plenitude is satisfied. But because Chalmers wants 
to use scenarios to ground an account of Fregean content, it turns out that an 
additional constraint is needed. I briefly mentioned that one of the key semantic 
                                                 
10
 Incidentally, this construction shows why the analogy between scenarios/verification and possible 
worlds/satisfaction should not be taken too seriously. I intuitively characterized the verification relation as 
follows: a scenario w verifies a sentence s when s is true at w. But it is unnatural to speak of sentences 
(including contradictions) being true (in some sense) just because they happen to be members of certain 
arbitrary sets. Similarly, one can see that the power set of the set of sentences is nothing like the space of 
possible worlds. 
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values that Chalmers associates with a sentence is its primary intension. Having 
now encountered the verification relation, I can say more precisely that a 
sentence’s primary intension is a function from scenarios to the truth value of 
ver(w,s).11 To fill the role that Chalmers intends for them, primary intensions must 
satisfy certain principles of compositionality. So, for example, if a given scenario 
verifies s and verifies t, it should also verify the conjunction s&t. But it is easy to 
see that the current suggestion will not allow for compositionality. Consider the 
scenario w = {s =‘Water is H2O’, t = ‘Lead is a compound’}. w verifies s and 
verifies t (given that s is a member of w and t is a member of w), but w doesn’t 
verify s&t (given that w only contains two atomic sentences). This example 
motivates adopting the following additional constraint of adequacy for an account 
of epistemic space: 
Compositionality: When a complex sentence s is composed from simpler 
sentences si and truth-functional connectives, ver(w,s) is determined by 
ver(w,si) in the corresponding truth-functional way. For example, ver(w,~s) 
iff ~ver(w,s), and ver(w,s&t) iff ver(w,s)&ver(w, t). 
 
1.5   The epistemic construction 
 In this section, I’ll present the specifics of Chalmers’ account of ideal 
epistemic space: the epistemic construction. Chalmers begins by using the 
notion of apriority to define three derivative notions (2011a: 67,76). (1) A 
sentence type d implies a sentence token/type s when the sentence ~dvs is a 
priori. (2) A sentence d is epistemically complete iff for all sentences s, d implies 
                                                 
11
 Chalmers actually says that a sentence’s epistemic intension is a function from scenarios to ver(w,s) 
(2011a: 65). But it is clear that Chalmers intends for epistemic intensions to be functions from scenarios to 
truth values. 
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s or d implies ~s. (3) Two sentences s and t are members of an equivalence 
class when s implies t and t implies s. 
 To help convey the intuitive idea behind epistemic completeness, I’ll give 
an example of how we might go about constructing an epistemically complete 
sentence. Suppose we start with the sentence ‘John is a bachelor’. ‘John is a 
bachelor’ will imply many sentences, such as ‘John is a bachelor or John is tall’, 
‘John is male’, ‘John exists’, etc.  It will also rule out many sentences a priori, 
such as the sentences ‘John is married’, ‘It is not the case that John exists’, etc. 
But many sentences are neither implied nor ruled out, such as ‘Water is identical 
to H2O’, ‘Mozart composed 41 symphonies’, ‘There are 12 oceans on planet 
earth’, etc. Since it is still an open question whether ‘Water is identical to H2O’, 
etc. are true when given ‘John is a bachelor’, ‘John is a bachelor’ is not 
epistemically complete. So we have to adjoin more sentences to ‘John is a 
bachelor’ until we have a sentence that “settles everything”. Obviously, many 
epistemically complete sentences will be quite long (in fact, Chalmers’ account 
requires infinitary sentences).12 For example, any epistemically complete 
sentence corresponding to the actual world will imply all physical truths of the 
actual world, all truths about the conscious experience of conscious subjects of 
                                                 
12
 One might wonder: isn’t it always possible to add further sentences that aren’t ruled out a priori? In one 
sense, the answer is yes. ‘John is a bachelor’ implies an infinite number of sentences (including its infinite 
logical consequences). So, for example, one can always adjoin additional logical consequences of ‘John is a 
bachelor’ to a sentence that includes ‘John is a bachelor’. But when we do so, we don’t move any step 
closer to building an epistemically complete sentence: all of these logical consequences were already 
implied by the original sentence. One might think that there is a stronger sense in which it is possible to add 
further sentences that aren’t ruled out a priori. Can’t we, for example, always add the description of some 
additional hydrogen atom to our growing sentence? While Chalmers allows that some epistemically 
complete sentences are infinitary, they need not be. This is because we can add a totality sentence that, 
intuitively, states that the world is no bigger than is necessary to accommodate the truth of all of the other 
sentences in the conjunction. Chalmers (forthcoming) discusses various ways to formalize totality clauses in 
(ch. 3). 
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the actual world, all truths about Joan of Arc, all truths about the stock market, all 
truths about bicycles, etc. 
 Intuitively, an epistemically complete sentence is a long conjunction that 
represents a maximally specific way the world might be, for all we know a priori. 
So on Chalmers account, scenarios are defined to be equivalence classes of 
epistemically complete sentences.13 It is then natural to say that a scenario w 
verifies a sentence s when d implies s, where d is some member of the 
equivalence class of w. 
 It is easy to see the advantages of the epistemic construction. The 
construction satisfies compositionality because the set-membership verification 
relation has been replaced by the implication relation, which is governed by an 
analogous principle of compositionality. For example, if a scenario w verifies s 
and t, then w will also verify their conjunction s&t (since any scenario that implies 
s and t will also imply their conjunction s&t). Chalmers gives various arguments 
for why the epistemic construction also satisfies Plenitude. Another attractive 
feature of the epistemic construction is that each scenario corresponds to a 
maximally specific epistemic possibility (for example, equivalence classes won’t 
include sets like {s =‘Water is H2O’, t = ‘Lead is a compound’}). At the very least, 
the inclusion of less specific scenarios seems redundant and less parsimonious. 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Why equivalence classes? Intuitively, a single maximally specific epistemic possibility can be described by 
many different epistemically complete sentences. For example, rearranging the conjuncts in an epistemically 
complete sentence will yield another epistemically complete sentence that describes the same possibility. 
So it is more parsimonious to group together sentences that imply one another. 
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1.7   The materials required for the epistemic construction 
 In the last several sections, I have presented a basic outline of Chalmers’ 
account of epistemic space. We are now in a position to clearly state what seems 
to be required by the epistemic construction. To accept the epistemic 
construction, a theorist must first accept: 
 (1) Some account or other of the psychological/epistemological difference 
between the thoughts H=H and H=P. Chalmers wants to assign different modal 
properties to sentences like ‘H=H’ and ‘H=P’ without presupposing Fregean 
content. So he cashes out the notion of sentence knowledge in terms of token 
mental states, appealing to the intuitive idea that ‘H=H’ and ‘H=P’ are associated 
with cognitively distinct thoughts. Importantly, the epistemic construction only 
requires some account of the difference between H=H and H=P; it doesn’t 
specifically require Fregean content. Of course, some theorists (e.g. Soames 
(2005)) deny a difference between H=H and H=P. But, says Chalmers, if a 
theorist can’t distinguish the mental states associated with sincere utterances of 
‘H=H’ and ‘H=P’, then so much the worse for her theory. Since most theorists 
share this intuition, it seems like a wide variety of theorists can accept (1). 
(2) A notion of idealized apriority. (2) is much more controversial than (1). 
Some theorists will be troubled by the notion of apriority itself, while others will be 
troubled by the idealization employed in the notion of apriority. For what it is 
worth, Chalmers (forthcoming) extensively defends both the general notion of 
apriority (ch. 5) and the idealization (ch. 2) required for the account. While I will 
generally take the notion of idealized apriority for granted throughout this paper, 
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suffice to say that anyone who rejects this notion will also reject the epistemic 
construction.14 
 Prima facie, it seems like any theorist who accepts (1) and (2) can accept 
Chalmers’ account of epistemic space.15 And because primary intensions are 
nothing more than functions defined across the space of scenarios, it seems that 
anyone who accepts the epistemic construction is also in a position to accept 
Chalmers’ Fregean content. Is it really true that any theorist who accepts (1) and 
(2) can also accept Fregean content? Of these two requirements, (2) seems to 
be the more controversial. But as I’ve mentioned, I’m going to take the notion of 
idealized apriority for granted. Instead, I will use section 2 to consider (1) more 
carefully.  
2   Russellian guises 
 Russellian theorists claim that H=H and H=P are associated with the same 
proposition. But Russellians can still distinguish the thoughts H=H and H=P by 
appealing to the notion of a propositional guise.16 So any Russellian who accepts 
an account of propositional guises can accept (1). But in this section, I will argue 
that it is possible to acknowledge a cognitive difference between H=H and H=P 
while stopping short of accepting Fregean content. 
                                                 
14
 The one place where I will discuss idealized apriority further is in section 5, where I will argue that this 
notion is incompatible with certain Russellian accounts of propositional guises. 
 
15
 Chalmers’ account also requires the assumption that there are token mental states that can stand in 
relations of negation, disjunction, etc. to each other. Because the vast majority of theorists will grant this 
assumption and because I will assume that thoughts stand in logical relations throughout this thesis, I 
haven’t listed it separately. But some philosophers (such as Lewis (1994)) reject the view that there are 
token mental states. Chalmers acknowledges that if someone rejects token mental states, they will need to 
understand sentence knowledge in a different way. 
 
16
 Of course, there is disagreement among Russellians over what explains the cognitive difference between 
H=H and H=P. But in general, I will use the term “guise” as a blanket term covering all Russellian accounts. 
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 Specifically, I will show that different accounts of the H=H/H=P distinction 
will generate different spaces of scenarios. But not all spaces of scenarios are 
capable of grounding primary intensions with suitable Fregean properties. I will 
argue that, if it is to generate a suitable space of scenarios, any account of the 
difference between H=H and H=P must meet three constraints. As shall be seen, 
various Russellian accounts of guises are unable to meet these constraints. This 
threatens the claim that any theorist who accepts (1) and (2) is in a position to 
accept the epistemic construction and the derivative Fregean content. 
2.1   Constraint 1: The publicity constraint 
 One important constraint on any adequate account of linguistic/mental 
content is the publicity requirement: it must be possible at least in principle for 
different thinkers/speakers to have thoughts/sentences that share content. It 
follows that, if Chalmers is to use scenarios to ground an adequate account of 
Fregean propositions, the space of scenarios must be subject-independent. For 
example, Chalmers wants to develop an account where Oscar’s utterance of 
‘Water is wet’ and Twin-Oscar’s utterance of ‘Water is wet’ are associated with 
the same Fregean content (2011a: 105). But Oscar and Twin-Oscar can only 
grasp the same Fregean content if the space of scenarios for Oscar is the same 
as the space of scenarios for Twin-Oscar.17 
                                                 
17
 Chalmers notes that the picture of a subject-independent space of scenarios has to be modified slightly in 
order to handle certain types of sentences involving phenomenal demonstratives. But if we restrict the 
language for scenario construction to eliminate these types of expressions, we can use the resulting 
scenarios to analyze sentences that do not contain these types of demonstratives. Chalmers adds that, for 
subjects using phenomenal demonstratives, scenario spaces are still isomorphic. Throughout this paper, I 
will ignore all complications arising from demonstratives and indexicals. 
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 Chalmers recognizes that, if scenarios need to be subject-independent, 
then it must be that scenarios (ie, epistemically complete sentences) are built up 
out of sentence types rather than sentence tokens. To see why, suppose that 
scenarios are composed of sentence tokens. One can see from the account of 
sentence token apriority that any sentence token is paired 1:1 with a thought 
token. But it doesn’t seem like thought tokens are the kind of thing that can be 
shared by different thinkers. So similarly, a given sentence token is essentially 
tied to the speaker uttering that token. So we cannot generate a subject-
independent account of epistemic space if we compose scenarios out of 
sentence tokens.18 
 So Chalmers (forthcoming) offers the following account of sentence type 
knowledge: a subject S knows a sentence type t iff S has a thought apt to be 
expressed by t that constitutes an item of knowledge.19 Similarly we can say that 
a sentence type t is a priori iff there is an a priori thought token apt to be 
expressed by t. Chalmers claims that a thought is only apt to be expressed by a 
sentence type t if it could be expressed by a fully competent and non-deferential 
utterance of t.20 Presumably, a sentence token tj only counts as a competent and 
                                                 
18
 One can observe that there is no similar reason why the objects of epistemic possibility must be 
considered sentence types. In fact, Chalmers wants assign primary intensions to tokens as well as types. So 
the objects of epistemic possibility are allowed to be sentence types or sentence tokens. 
 
19
 See Excurses 3 of Constructing the World. Once again, I am following Chalmers’ discussion in CtW 
because it offers more details than the discussion in The Nature of Epistemic Space. 
 
20
 In this footnote, I’ll explain the restriction to competent and non-deferential utterances. Consider the 
sentence type ‘Water is H2O’. Most of the time, English speakers use this sentence to express a certain 
thought about a certain chemical kind. But it seems like the same orthographic expression could be used to 
express any number of other thoughts. For example, it is surely possible to use ‘Water is H2O’ to express 
the thought that we normally express with the sentence ‘All bachelors are unmarried’. But then, according to 
the definition of sentence type apriority, ‘Water is H2O’ counts as an a priori sentence type. By parity of 
reasoning, it seems like every sentence type will qualify as a priori, which would be a clear violation of 
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non-deferential utterance of a sentence type t if it expresses a thought of some 
appropriate type T. So we see that, just as there is a 1:1 pairing of sentence 
tokens with thought tokens, there is analogous 1:1 pairing of sentence types with 
thought types. The picture is: scenarios are built up out of sentence types (‘H=H’, 
‘H=P’, etc.) that are distinguished by their corresponding thought types. For an 
even simpler picture, one can think of building scenarios directly out of thought 
types.21 For the rest of this paper, it will sometimes be more convenient to speak 
in terms of thought types and sometimes in terms of sentence types, but one 
should keep in mind the close relation between them. 
 So it now seems that, if a theorist is to accept Chalmers’ construction of 
scenarios, she must first accept (1′): some account of thoughts that distinguishes 
H=H and H=P as subject-independent thought types. But (1′) is stronger than (1): 
not every theorist who distinguishes the thought tokens H=H and H=P also 
accepts that H=H and H=P are distinct thought types. For example, Field (1977) 
claims that ‘H=H’ and ‘H=P’ are distinct because they have different inferential 
roles, but Field’s inferential roles are not subject-independent.22 In other words, 
Field will accept that that it is possible to know ‘H=H’ while failing to know ‘H=P’, 
but Field won’t accept that there is a space of epistemically complete sentence 
                                                                                                                                                 
Plenitude (and also Compositionality). Chalmers avoids this worry with the restriction to competent and 
nondeferential utterances. It is clear that because of this restriction, the sentences of the epistemic 
construction are not typed merely according to orthography. They are interpreted sentences in a language. 
 
21
 Chalmers acknowledges that scenarios could be built out of thought types instead of sentence types. But 
he claims that working with sentences is more convenient because the identity conditions for sentences are 
more straightforward than the identity conditions for thoughts. 
 
22
 More specifically, Field cashes out inferential roles in terms of a subjective probability function defined 
over all the sentences of a speaker’s language. The probability function represents how the speaker will 
update her credence in a certain sentence conditional on the credence she assigns to other sentences in the 
language. 
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types. And while it may be safe to reject any account that doesn’t distinguish a 
subject’s sincere utterances of ‘H=H’ and ‘H=P’, it is not so obviously obligatory 
that an account must separate these utterances into subject-independent types. I 
conclude that the epistemic construction is unavailable to any theorist who 
accepts an account of Russellian guises not satisfying the publicity constraint. In 
some sense, it shouldn’t be too surprising that one cannot ground subject-
independent Fregean content if one is starting with an account of sentence 
knowledge that is ultimately cashed out in terms of subject-dependent guises. 
 Still, many Russellians acknowledge that H=H and H=P fall under distinct 
subject-independent types. These theorists have a method of typing thoughts 
that will allow for the construction of subject-independent scenarios. But in 2.2 
and 2.3, I will argue that the scenarios generated when typing thoughts according 
are nonetheless unfit for grounding an account of Fregean content. 
2.2   Constraint 2: The holism constraint 
 Many Russellians have sought to differentiate H=H and H=P as types by 
appealing to the distinct causal/computational roles associated with these 
thoughts (see, for example, Block (1986), Harman (1987), and Lycan (1994)). 
Simplifying, we might say that a token thought A is causally connected to a token 
thought B if a subject in state A is causally disposed in certain actual and 
counterfactual circumstances to transition into state B. A thought’s causal role 
captures all of its causal connections to other thoughts. 
 Causal/computational roles are “intrasubjectively holistic”: in order to 
specify the causal/computational role of a given subject’s thought T, one must 
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specify the subject’s entire causal thought “web”. T’s identity conditions are 
determined by the causal web in which it is embedded; if the subject’s thought 
web was different, T would no longer be one of the subject’s thoughts. To make 
the same point another way: if two subjects have different thought webs, then 
those subjects share none of the same thoughts.23 
 Per the discussion in 2.1, scenarios are constructed out of sentence types, 
each of which corresponds to a thought type. Now suppose we type thoughts 
according to causal role. On this proposal, the sentences of the language will be 
associated (derivatively) with a causal web, each node of which represents a 
corresponding thought type. Now presumably, no matter what the causal network 
associated with the language looks like, there will be some subject B whose 
thoughts form a different causal network. The problem for the causal role 
proposal arises when we think about what it means for a scenario to verify one of 
B’s token thoughts.24 A scenario w verifies a token thought T when an 
epistemically complete thought U associated with w implies t; that is, w verifies T 
when ~UvT is a priori. So the idea that w verifies T is only coherent if it is 
possible to entertain the thought ~UvT. But if U and T belong to different causal 
webs, it doesn’t make any sense to speak of entertaining the thought ~UvT. If we 
tried to somehow put U and T in the same thought web, they would no longer be 
                                                 
23
 This feature of causal inferential role semantics (CRS) has been often criticized (see Fodor and Lepore 
(1992), Lepore (1994)). CRS theorists have given a variety of responses. For example, many theorists have 
claimed that only a subset of a thought’s causal transitions are actually meaning-constitutive. While I will 
briefly return to this issue in section 5, the argument I make in this section is independent of these concerns. 
The present argument is not an argument against CRS itself; the argument only shows that typing thoughts 
according to causal/computational role cannot generate a space of scenarios that can ground an account of 
Fregean content. 
 
24
 Remember that Chalmers want to assign epistemic intensions to token thoughts, and the epistemic 
intension for a thought T is a function from scenarios to ver(T,w), where w is a scenario. 
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the same thoughts U and T, but some other thoughts U′ and T′ that belong to a 
different causal web.25 
 The problem is that even though causal/computational webs can be 
shared between subjects (thus satisfying the publicity constraint), they need not 
be shared. It is easy to see that similar problems will be generated for any 
proposal on which a subject’s thoughts are individuated based only on how they 
are related to the other thoughts of that particular subject. Methods of typing 
thoughts that are “intrasubjectively holistic” generate scenarios that are 
unsuitable for grounding an account of Fregean content. This shouldn’t be too 
surprising, since Chalmers’ Fregean propositions are not supposed to be 
intrasubjectively holistic. I’ll call this the holism constraint.  
2.3   Constraint 3: the invariance constraint 
 So far, I’ve talked as if English sentence types might be used in scenarios. 
But the proposal to use English sentence types runs into immediate difficulties. In 
fact, Chalmers identifies three constraints that a language must satisfy if it is to 
be suitable for the construction of scenarios; any language satisfying these 
constraints is called an ideal language (2011a: 75). First, an ideal language must 
allow infinitary sentences; this is because some epistemically possible sentence 
tokens can only be verified by scenarios with infinite extent. Second, an ideal 
language must have a sufficiently broad lexicon in order to have adequate 
expressive power to describe all maximally specific epistemic possibilities. 
                                                 
25
 Of course, if we abstract away from causal roles and consider just the Russellian content of U and T, then 
it is clearly possible that ~U and T can stand in a relation of disjunction to one another. But at present, we 
are considering the causal/computational roles associated with U and T. 
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Finally, the sentence types of an ideal language must be invariant (for an 
explanation of why the sentences of the ideal language must be invariant, see 
footnote 28). 
  A sentence type s is variant iff it supports potential differences in apriority 
among fully competent users. A sentence type is invariant iff it is not variant. For 
example, suppose that Leverrier uses the name ‘Neptune’ synonymously with the 
definite description ‘the body that disturbs Pluto’s orbit’. Then it is a priori for 
Leverrier that ‘Neptune disturbs Pluto’s orbit’. We can further suppose Leverrier’s 
wife uses the name the name ‘Neptune’ synonymously with the definite 
description ‘the planet that is typically second furthest from the sun in the Solar 
System’. Then it is not a priori for Leverrier’s wife that ‘Neptune disturbs Pluto’s 
orbit’. So, assuming both Leverrier and his wife are competent speakers, 
‘Neptune disturbs Pluto’s orbit’ is a variant type. 
 A sub-sentential expression e is invariant if all sentences involving it and 
only other invariant terms are invariant. For the ideal language to include only 
invariant sentence types, the ideal language’s vocabulary must include only 
invariant terms. But it is immediately clear that almost all terms of a natural 
language such as English are variant. Chalmers suggests that certain indexical 
terms (‘I’ and ‘now’) and certain logical and mathematical terms may qualify as 
invariant as they stand; almost every other term (‘Bill’, ‘know’, ‘water’, ‘hydrogen’, 
etc.) must be made more precise if they are to be included in the ideal language. 
To give an example of just how precise a term must be to be invariant, I will 
consider sentences involving the term ‘know’. 
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 There are many sentences involving the term ‘know’ that are a priori to 
any competent speaker. For example, suppose Gm is ‘John believes that grass is 
red & Grass is not red’ and Km is ‘John does not know that grass is red’. Solely 
on the basis of the description in Gm and our grasp of the concept of knowledge, 
most of us judge that Gm implies Km. So for most of us, GmKm is a priori.26 In 
fact, it is plausible that any competent user of the term ‘know’ will judge that Gm 
implies Km. Presumably, anyone who doesn’t judge that Gm implies Km isn’t 
actually a competent user of the term ‘know’. So the sentence GmKm is 
invariant. But other sentences involving the term ‘know’ provoke disagreement 
even among competent users. Let Gn be the conjunction of the following 
sentences in the following passage: 
'Smith believes with justification that Jones owns a Ford. Smith initially has no beliefs about Brown's 
whereabouts. Smith forms a belief that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, based solely on a 
valid inference from his belief that Jones owns a Ford. Jones does not own a Ford, but as it happens, 
Brown is in Barcelona'. (Chalmers and Jackson, 2001) 
 
 Let ~Kn be the statement 'John does not know that Jones owns a Ford or 
Brown is in Barcelona'. Upon accepting the description in Gn, most English 
speakers will judge that ~Kn. For these speakers, Gn~Kn is a priori. But, as is 
widely documented, many seemingly competent users disagree about Gettier 
cases.27 For these users, ~(Gn~Kn) is a priori. If we agree that the disagreeing 
parties each competently use the term ‘know’, then it is clear that the sentence 
                                                 
26
 Some philosophers claim that if AB is a priori, the terms of B must be definable using the terms of A. 
Chalmers/Jackson describe this view as follows: ‘On this view, a priori [implication] requires definitions, or 
explicit conceptual analyses: that is, finite expressions in the relevant language that are a priori equivalent to 
the original terms, yielding counterexample-free analyses of those terms’ (Chalmers and Jackson, 2000). 
This is not the view of apriority Chalmers is employing. Chalmers/Jackson explicitly deny that ‘knowledge’ 
can be given an explicit, finite conceptual analysis: this is one of the main ways in which they resist the 
objections raised by Block/Stalnaker (1999). 
 
27
 See Weinberg, Stich and Nichols (2003). 
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Gn~Kn supports differences in apriority between competent users. It follows 
that the term ‘know’ itself is variant (on the assumption that the rest of the terms 
in ‘Gn~Kn’ are invariant). Of course, there are seemingly endless iterations of 
controversial cases in the Gettier spirit: there would have to be uniform 
agreement about these cases as well. From this example we can see just how 
strong the restriction to invariance terms really is: if ‘know’ is to be admitted to the 
ideal language, all competent users have to agree on the a priori status of every 
sentence involving “know”.28 
 But not every Russellian account has a method of typing sentences that is 
able to meet the invariance constraint.29 For example, some theorists have 
suggested that “stereotypes” (Putnam, 1975) can help explain the cognitive 
significance of certain terms. The stereotype associated with a term C is a set of 
descriptions that any competent user associates with C. For example, any 
competent user of the term ‘water’ might associate ‘water’ with the description 
                                                 
28
 The motivation for the requirement that the language contain only invariant terms is not immediately clear 
from Chalmers quick remarks in The Nature of Epistemic Space. But here is an argument for why invariance 
is required. Consider again the example of Leverrier, who uses the name ‘Neptune’ synonymously with the 
definite description: ‘the body that disturbs Pluto’s orbit’. Leverrier’s wife uses the name ‘Neptune’ 
synonymously with the definite description: ‘the planet that is typically second furthest from the sun in the 
Solar System’. Suppose we are constructing a scenario, where, intuitively, there is no body that disturbs 
Pluto’s orbit but there is a planet that is typically second furthest from the sun. Suppose this scenario can be 
described with the conjunction D. Let N be the sentence ‘Neptune does not exist’. Then for Leverrier, the 
sentence DN is a priori, while for Leverrier’s wife, the sentence ~(DN) is a priori. But now recall the 
definition of sentence type apriority: a sentence type t is a priori iff there is an a priori thought that is apt to 
be expressed by t. So both DN and ~(DN) count as a priori sentence types. The easiest way to see that 
this is a disastrous consequence is that since both DN and ~(DN) are a priori, both will be implied by 
any scenario. So every scenario will imply a contradiction. Since every sentence is implied by a 
contradiction, every scenario will verify every sentence. Most basically, we can see that an inconsistency will 
be generated whenever a sentence s and its negation are both apt to express a thought constituting a priori 
knowledge. This is why the ideal language must consist of only invariant sentences: any sentence that 
supports a difference in apriority between competent users will generate inconsistent scenarios. 
 
29
 Of course, since sentence types are cashed out in terms of thought types, the invariance constraint on the 
sentences of the ideal language directly translates into an invariance constraint on the thoughts associated 
with the sentences of the ideal language. But for convenience, I will continue to cast the dialectic in terms of 
sentences for the rest of 2.3. 
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‘the odorless, colorless liquid… etc.’ Some have thought that stereotypes can be 
used to explain the cognitive similarity between Oscar’s utterance of ‘Water is 
wet’ and Twin-Oscar’s utterance of ‘Water is wet’. 
 Putting aside the many objections that can be made against this type of 
account of cognitive significance, it is clear that typing sentences according to 
stereotype is not going to satisfy the invariance constraint. For example, consider 
again the term ‘Neptune’. ‘Neptune disturbs Pluto’s orbit’ is a priori for Leverrier, 
but it isn’t a priori for many competent users who grasp the stereotype associated 
with ‘Neptune’. The basic problem with Putnam’s stereotypes is that they are not 
nearly fine-grained enough to capture the full cognitive significance of an 
expression. But then it is no surprise that they can’t be used to generate 
scenarios that are able to ground an account of fine-grained Fregean content. 
We can see that the same problem will arise for any other account of 
propositional guises that doesn’t fix the a priori status of every token sentence 
falling under a give type. 
2.4   Summary 
 At the end of section 1, we saw that Chalmers’ account of Fregean 
content seems to be available to any theorist who accepts (1) some account or 
other of the difference between the thoughts H=H and H=P and (2) the notion of 
idealized apriority. My purpose in section 2 has been to investigate whether it is 
really true that any theorist who acknowledges a cognitive difference between 
H=H and H=P is in a position to accept Chalmers’ Fregean content. To this end, I 
offered three constraints that any method of distinguishing H=H and H=P must 
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satisfy if it to be used to generate scenarios that can ground Fregean content. I 
showed that a variety of well-known Russellian accounts of proposition guises 
are unable to meet these constraints. (Of course, this “failure” is not necessarily a 
strike against these accounts; the failure only shows that they are unavailable for 
Chalmers’ construction). 
 I don’t think it should be very surprising that the scenario spaces 
generated by the various Russellian accounts are not suitable for grounding 
Fregean content. After all, there is a very tight connection between scenarios and 
primary intensions, and presumably primary intensions have different properties 
than Russellian guises. Field’s inferential roles can be used to generate a 
subject-dependent space of scenarios, but this space can’t be used to ground 
subject-independent primary intensions. Causal/computational roles can be used 
to generate different spaces of scenarios for subjects with different causal 
networks, but they can’t be used to ground Fregean content that isn’t 
intrasubjectively holistic. Similarly, coarse-grained stereotypes can’t be used to 
ground fine-grained Fregean propositions. 
 On the one hand, the failure of Russellian methods of typing shows that 
the dispute between the Fregean and the Russellian is not merely verbal. 
Primary intensions are distinct from Russellian guises in at least one of the 
following ways: they are publicly sharable, they are fine-grained, and they are not 
intrasubjectively holistic. But on the other hand, it is no longer clear that 
Chalmers’ account of Fregean content is available to as wide a variety of 
theorists as was initially supposed. 
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 Since it is not the case that any account of the cognitive difference 
between H=H and H=P can generate suitable scenarios, what kind of account is 
required? It would obviously be unsatisfactory to take Fregean content itself as 
primitive; while this primitive would allow us to satisfy the above constraints, it 
would open Chalmers’ account to a circularity objection. Instead, I will consider in 
section 3 whether we can use the notion of apriority itself to type thoughts in a 
way that generates an appropriate space of scenarios. If we can, we will thereby 
show that Chalmers’ account only requires (2): a notion of idealized apriority. 
3   Apriority roles 
 A thought token Ti stands in the implication relation to another thought 
token Tj when ~TivTj is a priori. For any thought token Ti, there will be a set Ci of 
thoughts implied by Ti and a set Di of thought tokens that imply Ti. At the very 
least, Ci will include all logical consequences of Ti and Di will include all 
sentences logically implying Ti. Often Ci (or Di) will include more than the set of 
logical consequences. For example, the thought Grass is green implies the 
thought Grass is colored. Of course, each member Tj of the sets Ci and Di 
associated with Ti will itself be associated with a set Cj of thoughts implied by Tj 
and a set Dj of thoughts implying Tj. When we consider the set of all thoughts 
taken together, the picture that emerges is of a web of thoughts interconnected 
by implication relations. We can represent this web with the directed graph 
<T,A>, where T is the set of thoughts (the nodes) and A is a set of ordered pairs 
of nodes such that <Ti,Tj> ∈ A when Ti implies Tj. A sample apriority web is 
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depicted pictorially in Figure 1, where the nodes are thoughts and the arrows 
represent implication relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 1: A sample apriority web 
 We can characterize a thought Ti’s location in a given apriority web with 
the ordered pair <Ci,Di>. We can say that this ordered pair specifies the apriority 
role associated with Ti. In specifying a thought’s apriority role, we capture how it 
is connected to other thoughts via implication relations. 
 Now consider the proposal to type thoughts according to apriority role. 
Apriority roles meet the publicity constraint: presumably every subject can in 
principle have a thought that stands in certain implication relations to other 
thoughts. Apriority roles also meet the holism constraint: while apriority roles are 
holistic, they are not intra-subjectively holistic. This can be seen from the fact 
that, on the idealized notion of apriority, a given thought can imply thoughts 
outside of its subject’s causal inferential web. For example, my thought Water is 
a liquid implies every true mathematical thought even though many of these 
mathematical thoughts are found nowhere in my causal web. If we type thoughts 
according to apriority role, there will be a single apriority web associated with the 
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language used to construct scenarios. Apriority roles also meet the invariance 
constraint, since all thoughts with the same apriority role will have the same a 
priori connections to other thoughts. In fact, it is easy to see that, if any method of 
typing thoughts is to satisfy the invariance constraint, then all tokens falling under 
a given type generated by the method must share the same apriority role. 
Suppose two thought tokens A and B were connected by an implication relation 
in one subject’s thought web but not in another subject’s thought web. Then 
AB will be a priori for the first subject but not the second subject, thus violating 
the invariance constraint. 
3.1   Apriority potentials 
 Before moving on, I want to address an obvious problem with apriority 
roles as they now stand. One can observe that all a priori thoughts have the 
same apriority role. This is because any given a priori thought is implied by all 
thoughts. Similarly, the conjunction of any thought T with an a priori thought will 
have the same apriority role as T. We don’t want every a priori thought 
subsumed under the same type; apriority roles as they stand are too coarse-
grained. But this is a familiar problem; the familiar solution is to differentiate the 
thought 2+2=4 from the thought 3+7=10 insofar as they are built out of concepts. 
Just as a sentence can ultimately be decomposed into sub-sentential 
expressions, so too we can say that a thought can ultimately be decomposed into 
concepts. Of course, just as we required some account of separating H=H from 
H=P, we also need some way to distinguish the concept Hesperus from the 
concept Phosphorus. The natural suggestion is to distinguish concepts via their 
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distinct contributions to the compositional structure of various thoughts (which 
would themselves be characterized in terms of their a priori connections to other 
thoughts).30 We can then distinguish between two a priori thoughts by specifying 
how they are built out of their component concepts. For the rest of the paper, I 
will assume that that the notion of apriority role is fine-grained enough to 
distinguish between a priori thoughts with different compositional structures. 
3.2   Apriority roles vs. Fregean propositions 
 I’ll now explain how my account of apriority roles figures in the dialectic. 
Chalmers’ strategy for motivating his account of Fregean content can be roughly 
summarized as follows: first, he asks that we acknowledge that there is some 
difference or other in the psychological/epistemological properties of H=H and 
H=P. Any theorist who acknowledges this difference can accept a notion of 
sentence knowledge that allows for ‘H=H’ and ‘H=P’ to have distinct modal 
properties. With everyone on board with some notion of sentence knowledge, 
Chalmers uses the notion of apriority to define scenarios and the verification 
relation, which he then uses to ground an account of Fregean content. I think the 
problem with this strategy is that not every account of sentence knowledge can 
generate scenarios that are appropriate for grounding Fregean content. The 
problem seen in section 2 was that, while most Russellians acknowledge a 
difference between H=H and H=P, these accounts generate scenarios that are 
unsuitable for grounding Fregean content.  
                                                 
30
 Roughly, the concept Hesperus is the concept which: when combined with is a planet, generates a 
thought with apriority role Ai, when combined with is Phosphorus, generates a thought with apriority role Aj, 
when combined with …, etc. 
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 My proposal in this section has been to use the notion of apriority itself to 
develop a way of typing thoughts that will allow for the construction of suitable 
scenarios. I think this proposal is still very much in the spirit of Chalmers’ account 
of Fregean content, given that the core notion of apriority is clearly the distinctive 
feature of his account. When we tried to use Russellian guises to individuate 
thoughts for scenario construction, there was a mismatch: the generated 
scenarios didn’t have the right features (subject-independence, fine-grainedness, 
etc.). But with apriority roles, there is no mismatch, which is not surprising given 
that both apriority roles and Fregean content are built from the core notion of 
apriority. The other obvious advantage of the apriority role proposal is that it 
doesn’t require that a theorist accept any new controversial primitives or 
assumptions; Chalmers’ account already required the notion of apriority. 
 Apriority roles avoid the pitfalls mentioned in section 2. Does this mean 
that any theorist who accepts a notion of idealized apriority can accept Chalmers’ 
primary intensions? Or might there be some other reason why the scenarios 
generated by apriority role typing are unsuitable for grounding Fregean content? 
Suppose the notion of apriority is the only requirement of Chalmers’ account. 
Then we can use the apriority web associated with the ideal language to directly 
read off the thought types that count as scenarios (a node w will be a member of 
a scenario when, for every other thought type t, either w implies t or w implies ~t). 
We can also read off which thoughts are verified by a scenario including w simply 
by checking which thoughts are implied by w. So if the notion of apriority is all 
that is required for Chalmers’ account, it seems plausible that there will be 1:1 
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relation between apriority roles and primary intensions.31 But if there is a 1:1 
pairing of apriority roles with primary intensions, we could equally well use 
apriority roles themselves in our account of Fregean content. 
 In fact, I will argue in 3.3 that apriority roles are too coarse-grained to 
generate an appropriate space of scenarios. To this end, I will give examples that 
show that there can be a cognitive difference between two thoughts with the 
same apriority role. This result suggests that an adequate account of Fregean 
content requires more than just the notion of apriority. 
3.3   Symmetric apriority roles 
 The first example is a standard “spectrum inversion” case. Most 
philosophers agree that it is at least epistemically possible for there to be 
symmetric color spaces (if one does not accept that symmetric color spaces are 
epistemically possible, one can skip to the second example). We can suppose 
that there are pure phenomenal concepts associated with the different qualitative 
experiences that make up this space.32 It is very plausible that symmetry in a 
color space will generate “symmetry” in the apriority web (for example: there 
might be symmetry between the nodes corresponding to the thoughts This is 
white and This is black).33 We can represent the situation with the following 
                                                 
31
 This is because primary intensions are just functions from scenarios to ver(t,w). Strictly speaking, I said 
that our account of apriority roles should somehow distinguish between thoughts with the same a priori 
connections to other thoughts but different compositional structure. So apriority roles are actually more fine-
grained than primary intensions. But Chalmers’ enriched intensions (see footnote 1) take the compositional 
structure of a thought into account. So if we wanted to be more precise, we would ask: is there a 1:1 pairing 
between (fine-grained) apriority roles and enriched intensions? But for ease of presentation, I will continue to 
speak of primary intensions. 
 
32
 For a detailed discussion of pure phenomenal concepts, see Chalmers (2003). 
 
33
 For example, the thought This is white implies thoughts such as This is not black and This is white or John 
is tall. But the thought This is black implies thoughts such as This is not white and This is black or John is 
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graph (Fig. 2), where T1 is the thought This is white and T2 is the thought This is 
black: 
 
Figure 2: A symmetric apriority web 
 It is easy to see from the above graph that there is nothing to separate T1 
from T2 if we characterize T1 and T2 only in terms of their a priori connections to 
other thoughts. So T1 and T2 will both fall under the same apriority role type. One 
might try to appeal to the fact that This is white and This is black involve distinct 
concepts. But this is no help because, for the same reasoning as above, there is 
symmetry between the concepts black and white. So apriority roles, as they are 
currently defined, are too coarse-grained to generate a space of scenarios that 
can ground a suitable account of Fregean content.34 (Similarly, this shows that 
apriority roles, as they currently stand, cannot themselves serve as our account 
of Fregean content.) 
                                                                                                                                                 
tall. This argument echoes a criticism often leveled at functionalist theories of mental states, which, it is 
sometimes claimed, are unable to separate phenomenal mental states according to functional role alone. 
 
34
 This can be seen in the fact that, if we construct scenarios using apriority role typing, T1 and T2 will be 
included in all of the same scenarios (given that they have the same apriority role). This in turn ensures that 
every scenario that verifies T1 will also verify T2 and vice versa, giving both token thoughts the exact same 
primary intension despite the fact that they are cognitively distinct. 
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 While the above example shows that apriority roles are inadequate as 
they currently stand, it would be premature to abandon them at this point. One 
thing to note is that nothing in the above discussion directly hinged on taking the 
relations between thoughts in the web to be a priori implication relations. Indeed, 
more familiar causal inferential role theories have also had to confront the 
problems posed by symmetric color spaces.35 Since this is a problem everyone 
faces, we should consider whether the solutions employed by other theorists 
might also help with apriority roles. 
 Many inferential role accounts eliminate symmetries between thoughts by 
building thought-world relations directly into the inferential web. For example, 
some inferential role accounts allow for language “entry points” and language 
“exit points”.36 The exit points are behavioral states that are caused by a 
subject’s beliefs and desires, and the language entry points are states that cause 
a subject to token a certain mental state. While language exit points seem 
irrelevant to apriority roles, language entry points seem more useful. Suppose we 
take phenomenal states themselves as entry points and connect these entry 
points to pure phenomenal thoughts (such as This is white, etc.). Then we can 
distinguish T1 from T2 insofar as T1 is inferentially connected to a white 
phenomenal state and T2 is inferentially connected to a black phenomenal state. 
The relation between a sensory state and a thought like This is white isn’t 
                                                 
35
 For a discussion of this problem from a causal inferential role theorist, see Harman (1987). Functionalist 
theories in philosophy of mind have had to confront a closely related problem: how to individuate 
phenomenal mental states. For a functionalist solution to this problem, see Lycan (1987). 
 
36
 This terminology is borrowed from Sellars (2007). 
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technically an a priori implication relation, but introducing these language entry 
points doesn’t seem to do any great violence to the notion of an apriority role. 
 I think introducing sensory states as thought entry points can successfully 
eliminate symmetry between phenomenal thoughts. But I’ll now argue that this 
suggestion is unable to eliminate all symmetries in the apriority web. In the 
philosophy of science, structural realists claim that physics cannot reveal the 
intrinsic natures of the entities it studies. For example, some structural realists 
claim that while we can know the structural/causal properties of an electron, we 
cannot know anything about the fundamental “nature” or “essence” of an 
electron. We can refer to the potentially hidden intrinsic properties of 
microphysical entities as quiddities. 
 There are a variety of stances one might take towards quiddities. For 
example, Chalmers favors a “panpsychist” view on which various causal roles 
are filled by distinct phenomenal properties. One could also have a view on 
which quiddities are non-phenomenal intrinsic properties. Whatever stance on 
quiddities is correct, it doesn’t seem like their existence can be ruled out a priori. 
If this is the case, we will need to introduce sentences/thoughts to scenarios that 
describe the quiddistic features of those scenarios.37 I will show that certain 
thoughts needed to specify these quiddistic features have the same apriority 
roles. For simplicity, I’ll give an example of symmetric thoughts involving 
phenomenal quiddities (ie, the quiddities on the panpsychist picture). In other 
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 If one could rule out the existence of quiddities a priori, one wouldn’t need to introduce thoughts 
describing the quiddistic features of scenarios. The example I’m about to present assumes no such anti-
quiddity argument is available. 
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words, the thoughts I describe below are needed to describe the quiddistic 
features of “panpsychist scenarios”. 
 Chalmers claims that, in order to describe the quiddistic features of a 
panpsychist scenario, we need to introduce a variety of quiddistic concepts p1, 
p2, …, etc., where each pi refers to a distinct phenomenal quiddity (forthcoming: 
ch. 7). By including these concepts, we can distinguish two scenarios w1 and w2 
that differ only at the quiddistic level. For example, scenario w1 might include the 
thought p1 fills causal role R while scenario w2 might include the thought p2 fills 
causal role R. 
 Let T1 be a thought token p1 fills causal role R. Let T2 be the thought token 
p2 fills causal role R. It should be immediately clear that there can be symmetry 
between the concepts p1 and p2, just as there was symmetry between the pure 
phenomenal concepts black and white.38 As a result, it does not seem like 
apriority roles can be used to distinguish the quiddistic thoughts T1 and T2. I also 
observe that introducing sensory states as language entry points does nothing to 
eliminate the symmetry between T1 and T2. While we can certainly entertain the 
thoughts T1 and T2, these thoughts aren’t normatively connected to our sensory 
states.39 (Incidentally, the quiddity example doesn’t seem to provide a similar 
challenge to causal inferential role theories. This is because, while it is 
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 Indeed, the reason I’ve given an example specifically involving phenomenal quiddities is because I think it 
is particularly straightforward to see that phenomenal quiddity thoughts could have the same apriority role. 
For example, I think that anyone who accepts the possible symmetry between This is white and This is 
black should also accept that there can be symmetry between T1 and T2. But I see no reason why 
symmetric thoughts involving non-phenomenal quiddistic concepts could not be generated as well. 
 
39
 It is true that T1 and T2 are inferentially linked to certain thoughts that are themselves linked to 
phenomenal states, which might be thought to help matters (for example: T1 is linked to the thought T1 v 
This is white). But it is easy to see that for any such link involving T1, there will be an analogous link 
involving T2. 
  
 37
tremendously plausible that T1 and T2 have symmetric normative roles, there is 
no reason in particular to think that my thoughts T1 and T2 have symmetric causal 
roles.) 
3.4   Summary 
 At the end of section 1, I observed that Chalmers’ account of Fregean 
content seems to be available to any theorist who accepts (1) some account of 
the cognitive difference between H=H and H=P and (2) the notion of idealized 
apriority. But in section 2, I argued that various Russellian accounts of the 
H=H/H=P distinction do not generate a space of scenarios that can be used to 
ground Fregean content. In this section, I argued that apriority roles can avoid 
the problems encountered in section 2. Another plus is that accepting apriority 
roles only requires that a theorist accept (2). But I also argued that apriority role 
typing encounters its own problem. Since apriority roles are not fine-grained 
enough to reflect a thought’s full cognitive significance, they also are unable 
generate a space of scenarios that can ground Fregean content. The significance 
of the quiddity case in particular is that it doesn’t seem like there is any way to 
distinguish thoughts like T1 and T2 using just the notion of apriority. This suggests 
that an adequate account of Fregean content will require more than just the 
notion of apriority. In section 4, I will argue that Fregean content also requires the 
notion of super-rigidity. 
4   Super-rigidity 
 What is different about the thought tokens T1 and T2? Here is one obvious 
difference that the Russellian will probably acknowledge: T1 and T2 are 
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associated with different Russellian propositions. So here is one tempting 
suggestion for how to avoid collapsing T1 and T2 together: type thoughts 
according to apriority role and Russellian content.40 While this suggestion may 
seem to satisfactorily handle the quiddity case, it runs into immediate difficulties 
when applied to other thoughts. Consider Oscar’s thought token Water is a liquid 
and Twin Oscar’s thought token Water is a liquid. Chalmers wants an account of 
Fregean content on which Oscar and Twin Oscars’ thoughts are associated with 
the same Fregean content. Oscar and Twin-Oscar plausibly express thoughts 
with the same apriority role, but they obviously do not express thoughts with the 
same Russellian proposition. So Oscar and Twin Oscars’ thoughts will fall under 
different types. It looks like this suggestion will introduce two thought types 
(WaterXYZ is a liquid and WaterH2O is a liquid) where we need one (Water is a 
liquid).41 
 
                                                 
40
 According to a “dual aspect theory”, thoughts are associated with Russellian propositions and 
causal/computational roles (see Block (1986)). This suggestion resembles a “dual aspect theory” with 
apriority roles replacing the causal/computational role component. One might worry about the fact that the 
current suggestion presupposes Russellian propositions. But Chalmers is a “semantic pluralist”: he allows 
that there could be a variety of semantic values associated with sentences/thoughts. Indeed, he fully 
endorses the claim that one of the semantic values associated with a thought is its Russellian proposition. 
 
41
 It might have been more elegant to have single type encompassing both of their thoughts, but does the 
fact that the typing is more fine-grained generate any insurmountable difficulties? One might worry that the 
fine-grained typing threatens the subject-independence of scenarios; after all, all of Oscar’s thought tokens 
fall under one type and all of Twin-Oscar’s thought tokens fall under a second type. But I don’t think this is a 
serious problem: it is at least possible in principle for Oscar to entertain thoughts of the XYZ type (perhaps 
Oscar moves to Twin-Earth stays there long enough for the extension of his term ‘water’ changes). But when 
we think more about what introducing two thought types would look like, we can see that the suggestion to 
include WaterXYZ is a liquid and WaterH2O is a liquid as separate types for scenario construction is 
incoherent. I observe that, if WaterXYZ is a liquid and WaterH2O is a liquid are separated as thought types in 
scenario construction, it must be that WaterXYZ is a liquid and WaterH2O is a liquid tokens occupy distinct 
nodes in the apriority web associated with the ideal language. But this doesn’t seem to make any sense, 
given that the difference between waterXYZ and waterH2O is not cognitively accessible to the subject. (Of 
course, Oscar could entertain a thought involving the concept waterH2O*, where Oscar uses waterH2O* as 
synonymous with the definite description the clear, tasteless liquid … that is identical to H2O. But Oscar’s 
thought that waterH2O is wet is different from his thought that waterH2O* is wet.) 
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4.1   Super-rigid thoughts 
 The problem with typing according to apriority role and Russellian content 
stems from the fact that, for example, different tokens of the thought type Water 
is a liquid can be associated with different Russellian propositions.42 We can re-
describe the situation in epistemic terms: we don’t know a priori which Russellian 
proposition is associated with a given Water is a liquid token. As a result, typing 
according to Russellian content/apriority role is too fine-grained. What’s 
interesting is that this problem doesn’t seem to arise when we apply this method 
of typing to the quiddity thoughts T1 and T2. The same goes for the pure 
phenomenal thoughts. In these cases, it seems like we can know a priori what 
Russellian proposition is associated with a given thought token. 
 In a different context, Chalmers discusses the notion of super-rigidity 
(forthcoming: excurses 3).  We say that a concept is super-rigid when (i) its 
extension can be known a priori and (ii) one can know a priori that the concept is 
metaphysically rigid.43 Intuitively, a super-rigid concept is a concept that takes the 
same extension across all scenarios and all possible worlds. Chalmers suggests 
that the following concepts are plausibly super-rigid: pure phenomenal concepts, 
and, zero, law, fundamental, some, plus, believes, cause, friend, etc. We can say 
that a thought is super-rigid (SR) when it is logically composed of all and only 
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 In this section, whenever I refer to, say, the type Water is a liquid, I mean to refer to a thought type that 
includes both Oscar’s thought token and Twin Oscar’s thought token. 
 
43
 There are complications with cashing out what it means to know the extension of a concept a priori, but 
the examples given below should suffice to get across the intuition behind the notion. 
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super-rigid concepts.44 By construction, all tokens of a given SR thought type will 
be associated with the same Russellian proposition (equivalently: we can know a 
priori which proposition is associated with a token of a SR thought type). It 
follows that, when Oscar and Twin-Oscar express thought tokens falling under 
SR thought types, these tokens are guaranteed to be associated with the same 
Russellian proposition. So there is no barrier to typing SR thoughts according to 
(cognitively accessible) Russellian proposition and apriority role (henceforth: 
“Russellian/apriority typing”). This provides a nice explanation of why 
Russellian/apriority typing did not present any obvious difficulties in the quiddity 
or phenomenal examples. 
 Is the notion of super-rigidity acceptable to a wide variety of theorists? By 
this I mean: will most theorists accept the claim that certain concepts/thoughts 
have (a priori) cognitively accessible Russellian content? While I don’t think there 
is any reason why the Russellian qua Russellian should reject super-rigidity, in 
section 5 I will explain why certain theorists may be inclined to reject the claim 
that we ever have a priori cognitive access to the Russellian proposition 
associated with our token thoughts. But for now, let’s grant the notion of super-
rigidity (just as we granted the notion of apriority) and instead consider the 
question: is a theorist who accepts the notion of apriority and the notion of super-
rigidity in a position to accept Fregean content? We saw that with just the notion 
of apriority, we weren’t able to construct a space of scenarios appropriate for 
grounding Fregean content. Can the notion of super-rigidity solve this problem? 
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 We can also allow for a super-rigid thought to include indexical terms. In this paper, I am ignoring various 
complications involving indexical terms. So from now on I will often forego explicitly mentioning indexicals. 
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 First, we can consider super-rigid thoughts themselves. It is tremendously 
plausible that Russellian/apriority typing is fine-grained enough to reflect the 
cognitive significance of SR thoughts: it is very difficult to see how two thoughts 
could have the same cognitively accessible Russellian content and the same a 
priori connections to other thoughts while still being cognitively distinct. But it isn’t 
as clear that the notions of apriority and super-rigidity allow us to capture the full 
cognitive significance of non-super-rigid (NSR) thoughts, since NSR thoughts 
don’t have cognitively accessible Russellian content. I will consider this question 
in the next two sections. 
4.2   Implied NSR thoughts 
 Here is an example of NSR symmetry. From the quiddity case, p1 and p2 
are concepts for two symmetric but distinct phenomenal quiddities. I’ll now 
introduce two further quiddistic concepts p3 and p4 for two additional symmetric 
but distinct phenomenal quiddities. We can let T3 and T4 be the thoughts p3 fills 
causal role R and p4 fills causal role R. I note that, while T1-T4 all have the same 
apriority role, they can be distinguished via Russellian/apriority role typing, per 
the above discussion. Now consider the following two stipulated concepts: 
Let p5 be a concept such that: 
 if p1 fills causal role R, then p5’s extension is p1; else p5’s extension is p3 
Let p6 be a concept such that: 
 if p2 fills causal role R, then p6’s extension is p2; else p6’s extension is p4 
 
 Let T5 be the thought that p5 fills causal role R and let T6 be the thought 
that p6 fills causal role R. It should be clear from their description that T5 and T6 
have the same apriority role, even though neither is a super-rigid thought (for 
example, T5 is associated with a different Russellian proposition when p1 fills 
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causal role R vs. when p1 does not fill causal role R). Because T5 and T6 are 
NSR thoughts, we can’t use Russellian/apriority typing in order to separate them. 
 Nonetheless, it doesn’t seem like we need to introduce any new resources 
to capture the fact that T5 and T6 are cognitively distinct. One can observe that T5 
and T6 are not linked to the SR base in the same way. For example, T1 implies T5 
but not T6, while T2 implies T6 but not T5. But then, insofar as we are able to 
avoid collapsing the SR thoughts T1-T4 by using Russellian/apriority typing, we 
can also avoid collapsing the NSR thoughts T5 and T6 insofar as they are linked 
to T1-T4 in different ways. We see from this example how the notion of super-
rigidity can eliminate symmetry worries even among NSR thoughts. 
 This example suggests that we should distinguish implied NSR thoughts 
(NSR thoughts that, when they are included in a scenario, are always implied by 
some SR thought or other) from non-implied NSR thoughts (all other NSR 
thoughts). It is very plausible that we capture the full cognitive significance of 
implied thoughts just by specifying their apriority role (since this apriority role will 
always include connections to certain “designated” nodes with cognitively 
accessible Russellian content). If two thoughts (i) are symmetrically entailed by 
SR thoughts and (ii) have the exact same a priori connections to other thoughts, 
then it is difficult to see how they could be cognitively distinct. 
 Although he discusses this issue in a very different context, I mention that 
Chalmers claims that all NSR thoughts are implied by SR thoughts (forthcoming: 
ch. 8). If this thesis is true, then we can confidently say (on the basis of the above 
discussion) that any theorist who accepts the notions of apriority and super-
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rigidity can accept Fregean propositions. But this thesis is extremely 
controversial (see footnote 45).45 So in the next section, I will assume this thesis 
is false and that there are non-implied NSR thoughts. So the question remaining 
is whether we can capture the full cognitive significance of non-implied thoughts 
using only the notions of apriority and super-rigidity. 
4.3   Non-implied NSR thoughts 
 While it was easy to generate an example of cognitively distinct implied 
NSR thoughts with the same apriority role, it is much more difficult to generate an 
example for non-implied thoughts. One might interpret the difficulty in generating 
such an example as evidence that there are no symmetries of this kind. If this 
were true, then we could just type non-implied thoughts according to apriority 
role. On the other hand, one might think that the previously observed cases of 
symmetry count as prima facie evidence that it is at least metaphysically possible 
for there to be symmetry between non-implied thoughts. 
 It is difficult to assess this issue, but I will make a significant observation. 
In the previous examples, it seems like apriority roles were too coarse-grained 
because they failed to capture something cognitively significant about the 
extension of the concepts in the relevant thoughts. For example, in the SR 
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 More precisely, Chalmers claims that all NSR thoughts are implied by SR thoughts and indexical thoughts 
(for simplicity, I am ignoring complications arising from indexicals in this thesis). Chalmers calls this thesis 
Generalized Super-Rigid Scrutability (GSRS) (forthcoming: ch.7, p.71). To get the intuition behind GSRS, I’ll 
describe how it applies to the actual world. In the actual world, there are many true thoughts involving NSR 
concepts: Water is identical to H2O, Electrons and protons attract one another, The population of the US is 
over 10,000, Earth has one moon, etc. There are also, presumably, many true thoughts that involve only 
super-rigid concepts (thoughts describing the distribution of fundamental properties, true mathematical 
thoughts, thoughts describing conscious experience with pure phenomenal concepts, etc.). If GSRS is true, 
then there is some conjunction C of super-rigid/indexical thoughts that are true of the actual world such that 
C implies Water is identical to H2O, Earth has one moon, etc. GSRS is an even stronger thesis then 
Chalmers and Jacksons’ well-known A Priori Entailment thesis, which states that all truths of our world are 
implied by PQTI (the set of microphysical truths, phenomenal truths, indexical truths, and a ‘that’s all’ 
clause). See Block and Stalnaker (1999) for a series of objections to the A Priori Entailment thesis. 
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symmetry cases, apriority roles couldn’t account for the cognitively accessible 
difference in extension between the concepts p1 and p2. In the NSR symmetry 
example considered earlier, apriority roles couldn’t account for the cognitively 
accessible difference in how p5’s extension and p6’s extension depend on the 
super-rigid base. Now consider the case of non-implied NSR thoughts involving, 
say, the concept water. We don’t have cognitive access to the extension of water 
(as we did for p1 and p2). Nor do we have cognitive access to the way in which 
water’s extension depends on the super-rigid base (as was the case for p5 and 
p6); if we did, then the super-rigid base would always imply a fact of the form 
Water is identical to X, where X is a super-rigid concept. But since, in the 
previous examples, apriority roles failed to reflect something cognitively 
significant about the extension of the relevant concepts, we can consider whether 
there might be something else cognitively significant about the extension of the 
concept water that isn’t reflected in water’s inferential potential. 
 Here’s one possibility of what I have in mind. Suppose we are given a 
super-rigid base C. Per the above discussion, we can’t uniquely identify the 
extension of water on the supposition that C obtains. But let’s suppose that, 
because of something cognitively significant about the concept of water, we are 
able to assign water a set of possible extensions (conditional on C). For example, 
suppose that if we are given C, we know that water either takes H2O as its 
extension or XYZ as its extension (I’m assuming H2O and XYZ are super-rigid 
terms, see footnote 46). Now could there be another concept with the same 
apriority potential as water but with a different class of possible extensions (given 
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C)? If there could be such an example, then water’s apriority potential does not 
reflect water’s full cognitive significance.46 
 But there is no worry that we could ever generate such an example. This 
is because any information about the possible extension of a concept is captured 
in the concept’s apriority potential. For example, if it is only possible for water to 
take H2O or XYZ as its extension, then every thought type of the form ~(C & 
Water is ___) will be a priori except when the blank is filled with Water or XYZ. 
As a result, all of this “information” will be reflected in water’s apriority potential. 
But then if some concept X were to have the same apriority potential as water, all 
of this information would be equally reflected in X’s apriority potential. We can 
refer to thoughts like Water is H2O as mixed super-rigid identities.47 I think the 
inclusion of MSR identities in the apriority web shows that, if the apriority roles of 
non-implied thoughts are too coarse-grained to reflect cognitive significance, it 
won’t be because they fail to capture something cognitively significant about the 
extension of the concepts composing those thoughts. 
                                                 
46
 Here are some clarificatory notes on the present example. (1) For ease of presentation, I am adopting the 
dubious assumption that H2O and XYZ are super-rigid concepts. Nothing in the argument turns on this 
assumption. (2) For simplicity, I am assuming that water only has two possible extensions when given C. But 
nothing in the argument hinges on their only being two possible extensions. Maybe there are 15 possible 
extensions, or an infinite number of possible extensions. Maybe any physical substance described in C (ie, 
C6H12, H2O2, etc.) is a possible extension for water. (3) To be clear, I am not arguing that we actually can 
assign a set of possible extensions to water based on some super-rigid base C. I’m only assuming this is 
possible for the sake of argument, since if it was possible, it could be a way in which two NSR terms with the 
same apriority potential could be cognitively distinct. 
 
47
 Up to this point in the thesis, I hadn’t acknowledged the possibility of “mixed-super-rigid” (MSR) thoughts. 
Since MSR thoughts are composed of SR and NSR concepts, it seems like we have cognitive access to at 
least a part of the Russellian proposition associated with an MSR thought. So typing MSR thoughts 
according to apriority role alone may not be able to capture the full cognitive significance of such thoughts. 
Instead, we might type MSR thoughts according to apriority role/”partial proposition”, where a partial 
proposition is some structured entity that reflects what we know a priori about an MSR thought’s Russellian 
content. Do we capture the full cognitive significance of MSR thoughts when typing them in this way? It 
seems to me that the issues arising for NSR thoughts are also likely to arise for MSR thoughts. 
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 Could there be some other way in which two thoughts with symmetric 
apriority roles could nonetheless be cognitively distinct? The difficulty in coming 
up with a convincing positive example is prima facie evidence that the answer is 
no. Consider also the fact that there didn’t seem to be any other way for SR and 
implied NSR thoughts to be cognitively distinct apart from their apriority roles and 
whatever was cognitively accessible about their Russellian content. On the basis 
of these considerations, I think the burden of proof resides with any theorist who 
claims that two cognitively distinct non-implied thoughts can have the same 
apriority role. 
 I conclude that, using only the notion of apriority and super-rigidity, we can 
capture the full cognitive significance of SR thoughts and implied NSR thoughts. 
The situation isn’t as clear for the case of non-implied NSR thoughts, but the 
overall evidence seems to suggest that we can capture the full cognitive 
significance for these types of thoughts as well. 
4.4   Summary 
 In section 1, we saw that Chalmers’ epistemic construction seems to 
require (1) some account or other of the difference between H=H and H=P and 
(2) a notion of idealized apriority. In section 2, I argued that many Russellian 
accounts of the difference between H=H and H=P are in fact not suitable for 
grounding an account of Fregean content. This presented the question: if it isn’t 
the case that any account of the H=H/H=P distinction is suitable to ground 
Fregean content, is there some suitable account of the distinction that is 
available to a wide variety of theorists? In section 3, I introduced the notion of an 
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apriority role in order to see whether we might use (2) itself to develop an 
appropriate account of the H=H/H=P distinction. But it was seen that apriority 
roles are too coarse-grained to ground Fregean content. In section 4, I sought to 
identify what else is required. I argued that there is prima facie reason to believe 
that any theorist who accepts (1′) a notion of super-rigidity and (2) a notion of 
idealized apriority is thereby in a position to accept Fregean content. By typing 
thoughts according to apriority role and cognitively accessible content, it seems 
like we can separate cognitively distinct thoughts with the same apriority role. 
 While I’ve argued that an adequate account of Fregean content requires 
(1′) and (2) rather than (1) and (2), I think the account of Fregean content built 
with (1′) and (2) is still very much in the spirit of Chalmers’ original proposal. 
Scenarios are still equivalence classes of epistemically complete sentences and 
the verification relation is still the implication relation. Similarly, the notion of 
apriority fills a crucial role in each account. The significant difference is that 
Chalmers’ original proposal sought to remain neutral on how to cash out the 
notion of sentence knowledge, while I’ve argued that this line is untenable. 
Instead, I’ve developed a specific way of cashing out sentence knowledge (in 
terms of super-rigidity and idealized apriority) that does not presuppose Fregean 
content. But even though the notion of super-rigidity isn’t built into Chalmers’ 
original proposal, I note that Chalmers himself accepts and defends the notion of 
super-rigidity in other work. 
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5   The Fregean and the Russellian 
 One of the puzzling features of Chalmers’ original proposal was that, in 
order to ultimately accept Fregean content, one had to already accept some 
account or other of the cognitive difference between H=H and H=P. This was 
puzzling in some sense because, if one already has an explanation of the 
H=H/H=P distinction, why should one also need an account of Fregean content? 
But in section 2, we saw that Russellian guises cannot generate scenario spaces 
suitable for grounding Fregean content. This was evidence that Russellian guises 
and Fregean content have different properties. On the basis of the conclusions 
from sections 2-4, we are now in a good position to compare the relative 
advantages of the Fregean and Russellian accounts. In 5.1, I will present some 
potential explanatory advantages of Chalmers’ Fregean content, drawing from 
the discussion in section 2. In 5.2, I will consider why certain theorists may 
nonetheless have reason to resist Chalmers’ account. 
5.1   Advantages of Fregean content 
 The first advantage of Fregean content is that it is very fine-grained. In this 
respect it has a clear advantage over, say, accounts that distinguish H=H and 
H=P by appealing to descriptive content/stereotypes.48 Fregean content is also 
subject-independent. In this respect, they seem to have a clear advantage over 
Field’s subjective inferential roles. For example, with Fregean content, we can 
                                                 
48
 Chalmers (2011b) argues that Fregean propositions can even account for hyperintensionality. For 
simplicity, I have usually used the phrase “Fregean content” to refer to a thought’s primary intension. With 
primary intensions alone, we cannot distinguish 2+2=4 and 3+3=6. But, as was mentioned in footnote 1, 
Chalmers distinguishes the thoughts 2+2=4 and 3+3=6 by first assigning primary intensions to the concepts, 
2, 3, etc. He then defines enriched intensions to be structured entities built out of the primary intensions of 
component concepts. So 2+2=4 and 3+3=6 will distinguished by their enriched intensions.  
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accommodate the intuition that there is something similar between Oscar and 
Twin Oscars’ utterances of ‘Water is a liquid’. 
 We’ve also seen that, in contrast to causal/computational roles, Fregean 
propositions are not intrasubjectively holistic. This seems like an advantage, 
since many of the most persistent criticisms lodged against causal inferential role 
semantics (CRS) are related to this aspect of causal role accounts. For example, 
it seems that no two subjects will ever completely agree in all of their 
counterfactual causal transitions from certain thought/sentences to other 
thoughts/sentences, etc. But since a thought’s causal role is determined by the 
thought’s location in a holistic causal network, this suggests that no two subjects 
will ever have beliefs with the same meaning (Lepore, 1994). There are a variety 
of proposed solutions to this problem. Some theorists suggest that CRS can at 
least provide an account of similarity in meaning by appealing to the notion of 
similarity in causal role (Block, 1995). But others argue that the notion of 
similarity in causal role cannot be cashed out without circularity (Fodor and 
Lepore, 1992). Some proponents have tried to restrict the set of inferences that 
contribute to a thought’s inferential role to a certain subset that are “meaning-
constitutive”. But such a move seems to require an analytic/synthetic distinction, 
and many philosophers reject such a distinction. Even if one accepts such a 
distinction, it is unclear how such a notion can be cashed out in terms of causal 
dispositions (Fodor and Lepore, 1992). My intent is not to argue against CRS; it 
may be that proponents of this view can give satisfactory responses to these 
objections. My claim is only that, insofar as Fregean propositions are not 
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intrasubjectively holistic, they may avoid certain problems traditionally associated 
with causal inferential roles. 
5.2   Costs of the Fregean account 
 We see that Chalmers’ Fregean content has a variety of attractive 
explanatory features. Indeed, I don’t see any obvious explanatory shortcoming of 
his account. For this reason, I think that if a theorist rejects Chalmers’ account, it 
will instead be because it relies on the controversial notions of super-rigidity and 
idealized apriority. In this respect, Russellian accounts of cognitive significance 
seem to have an advantage. These accounts don’t require notions that are as 
controversial as the notions of super-rigidity and idealized apriority. 
 It is outside the scope of this paper to assess the general arguments for 
and against super-rigidity and idealized apriority. Instead, I will conclude this 
paper by discussing why certain Russellian theorists may have specific reason to 
reject these notions. In this section, I’ll show why any Russellian who cashes out 
propositional guises in terms of causal inferential roles is likely to reject the 
notions of idealized apriority and super-rigidity. 
 In section 2.2, I argued that typing thoughts according to causal role 
cannot generate scenarios suitable for grounding Fregean content. The same 
argument can be used to show that causal inferential roles are in tension with the 
notion of idealized apriority itself. For example, it is safe to assume that there is 
at least one complicated mathematical thought T that is not a part of my causal 
network. But under idealization, T counts as a priori. Thus, T is implied by any 
given thought U in my causal web (recall that U implies T when ~UvT is a priori). 
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For U to imply T, it must be possible to entertain the thought ~UvT. But if U and T 
are members of different causal networks, it doesn’t make any sense to speak of 
entertaining the thought ~UvT. More generally, we see that the notion of 
idealized apriority is only coherent on the assumption that all thoughts are 
members of a single apriority web. But to be members of a single apriority web, 
two thoughts U and T need to be logically related in a certain way. But according 
to CRS, two thoughts can only be logically related in a certain way if they are 
members of the same causal network. So the CRS proponent can only accept a 
single apriority web if every possible subject has the same causal web. But, as a 
matter of fact, subjects have different causal webs. So idealized apriority and 
CRS are incompatible. 
 Does the incompatibility stem from the idealization or the notion of 
apriority simpliciter? I see no barrier to accepting CRS and accepting a non-
idealized notion of apriority according to which certain thoughts a priori imply 
certain other thoughts within the same causal network. The incompatibility stems 
from the idealization’s requirement that every thought is a member of the same 
apriority web. 
 I’ll now argue that there is also tension between CRS and the notion of 
super-rigidity. First, I’ll show how the notion of super-rigidity potentially sharpens 
an argument against CRS made by Fodor and Lepore (1992). Fodor and Lepore 
argue that CRS proponents need to provide an account of what glues a thought’s 
causal inferential role to its Russellian content. For example, what rules out the 
possibility that T has the inferential role of the thought Water is a liquid but is true 
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iff 16 is a prime number? Block (1998) claims that the CRS proponent need not 
be committed to any restrictions regarding what causal role can be paired with a 
given set of truth conditions. According to Block, there is no reason why truth 
conditions and causal roles could not be completely independent. But if a theorist 
acknowledges super-rigid content, Block’s response is unsatisfactory. In the case 
of a super-rigid thought type, all tokens have the same truth conditions. So if the 
thought 2+2=4 is associated with a particular causal role, there must be 
something gluing that causal role to the thought’s truth conditions. But then it 
seems like Fodor and Lepore’s glue argument kicks in again: how does the 
proponent of CRS explain the “glue” between truth conditions and causal role? 
 There is a second, more basic tension between CRS and the notion of 
super-rigidity: if one accepts that a certain thought T is super-rigid, T’s causal 
role seems irrelevant to explaining T’s cognitive significance. For example, 
suppose my thought 2+2=4 is super-rigid. Now further suppose that an alien with 
a completely different causal network has a super-rigid thought with the same 
cognitively accessible Russellian content.49 If we accept that both of these 
thoughts have the same cognitively accessible Russellian content, then it seems 
like we would be inclined to judge that they have the same cognitive significance 
despite the fact that they have different causal roles. This is because the 
thoughts’ cognitively accessible Russellian content seems to provide the best 
                                                 
49
 This argument obviously requires that it be possible for two thoughts with the same cognitively accessible 
Russellian content to have different causal roles. But if we grant super-rigid content, it does not seem like it 
is the type of thing that depends on a thought’s causal connections to other thoughts. 
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explanation of their cognitive significance. When we can compare super-rigid 
content, difference in causal role doesn’t seem to matter very much.50 
 I’ve argued that the CRS theorist has reason to reject the notions of 
idealized apriority and super-rigidity. As a consequence, a theorist cannot both 
accept CRS and Fregean propositions as explanations of the cognitive 
significance of thoughts. It is worth noting that there does not seem to be similar 
pressure for proponents of other accounts of Russellian guises to reject Fregean 
content. I see no reason why a theorist who accepts Fregean content might not 
also accept that sentences are associated with stereotypes (see section 2.3). 
While stereotypes are inferior to Fregean propositions when it comes to 
explaining cognitive significance, it seems like they might be useful for other 
purposes (perhaps stereotypes are useful for explaining what is required for a 
speaker to be competent with a public language expression). Similarly, I see no 
reason why a theorist who accepts Fregean content might not also accept that 
sentences are associated with Field’s subjective inferential roles (see section 
2.1) While Field’s inferential roles may not explain the similarity between Oscar 
and Twin Oscars’ thoughts, they may be useful for other purposes (for example: 
modeling the thought processes of non-ideal reasoners). 
 
 
                                                 
50
 One can consider the problem super-rigidity raises for CRS as analogous to a problem that has 
sometimes been raised against functionalist theories of mind. Some theorists argue that what makes a given 
pain state S the state that it is just is S’s phenomenal character. Accordingly, S’s causal connections to other 
states seem irrelevant to determining whether S is a pain state. For this reason, some theorists have found it 
plausible that a simple organism with a very different functional organization than our own (ie, a small fish) 
could nonetheless experience a phenomenal state like our pain states (Block, 1996).  
  
 54
Conclusion 
 Chalmers wants to develop an account of epistemic space that can be 
used to ground a widely available account of Fregean content. My purpose in this 
thesis has been to identify the assumptions required by Chalmers’ account. My 
conclusion is that any theorist who accepts the notion of super-rigidity and the 
notion of idealized apriority is thereby in a position to accept a version of Fregean 
content. So on the model of Fregean content considered in this paper, there are 
at least two ways in which a thought may be cognitively significant. One aspect of 
a thought’s cognitive significance is reflected in its a priori connections to other 
thoughts. But certain thoughts are also cognitively significant insofar as they 
have cognitively accessible Russellian content. 
 I concluded the thesis by comparing this account of Fregean content to 
alternative Russellian accounts of cognitive significance. The main disadvantage 
of the Fregean account is that it relies on the notions of super-rigidity and 
idealized apriority, both of which are likely to be controversial. I argued that CRS 
theorists in particular have reason to reject any account appealing to these 
notions. But if these notions can be adequately defended, Fregean content 
seems to have various explanatory advantages over Russellian guises. 
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